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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL RULE
11 AND LAWYER DISCIPLINE:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS SUGGESTING
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES IN THE
REGULATION OF LAWYERS
Peter A. Joy*
The more laws that you make,
the greater the number of criminals.]
I. INTRODUCTION
Drafters have always intended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 (Rule 11)2 to limit or eliminate abusive litigation behavior by
lawyers, though commentators, practicing lawyers, judges, and the
public have often questioned whether or not Rule 11 has been
effective. For many, various versions of Rule 11 have either been
ineffective in or counterproductive to improving lawyers' conduct.
The first iteration of Rule 11, in effect from 1938 through 1983,
produced only nineteen reported cases in which parties filed Rule 11
motions during a thirty-eight year period.3 Of these cases, courts
* Professor of Law and Director of Trial and Advocacy Program,
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. I am very grateful to Rick
Johnson, Pauline Kim, and the participants at the Faculty Workshop at
Washington University School of Law for their helpful comments to an earlier
draft of this article. I also thank Sean Burke and Laura Osterman for their
valuable research assistance, and especially Sean Burke for his very valuable
assistance with the empirical portion of this article.
1. TAO TE CHING 57 (J. McDonald trans.), available at http://
edepot.com/tao 15.html.
2. FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
3. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement:
Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN.
L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1976) (compiling Rule 11 cases from 1938 through 1976).
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found violations in eleven and sanctioned lawyers in only three.4 If
the pre-1983 form of Rule 11 was little used to control lawyers'
conduct and nothing more than a blinking yellow traffic light on the
litigation road, the amended form of Rule 11, in effect from 1983
through 1993, was a full-fledged speed trap resulting in nearly 7000
published Rule 11 opinions in less than ten years.
5
The stepped-up application of sanctions under the 1983 version
of Rule 11 became the subject of "vociferous debate within the
bench and bar" that led the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of
the Judicial Conference (Advisory Committee) to "scale back the
more draconian aspects of Rule 11" and amend it once more in
1993.6 The Advisory Committee indicates that this third, and so far
final, iteration of Rule 11 "is intended to remedy problems that have
arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the
rule' 7 and that a possible sanction under the 1993 version of Rule 11
may include "referring the matter to disciplinary authorities."
8
As a result of the Advisory Committee's statement that Rule 11
may be linked to possible lawyer discipline, some commentators
have either predicted or argued for more disciplinary referrals based
upon Rule 11 proceedings.9 Now, some ten years after the 1993
4. Id. at 36-37.
5. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589,
626 (1998). Professor Vairo found 6947 cases reported on computer databases
that cited or interpreted Rule 11 between 1983 and June of 1993. Id. at 626
n.259. The actual number of Rule 11 cases is probably much higher because
not all cases result in published opinions. For example, a Third Circuit Court
of Appeals study of Rule 11 cases found that less than forty percent of Rule 11
cases are available on Lexis or Westlaw. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK,
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 N TRANSmON: THE REPORT OF
THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11,
at 59 (1989). On the other hand, as the data collected and analyzed for this
article demonstrate, the number of cases citing the 1993 version of Rule 11 far
exceeds the number of cases in which courts imposed sanctions on lawyers for
their federal litigation conduct. See infra Part IHI.
6. Vairo, supra note 5, at 594; see also infra Part II.C for a discussion of
the controversy concerning the 1983 version of Rule 11.
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
8. Vairo, supra, note 5, at 587.
9. See generally Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy:
Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1617 (2001) (arguing for more frequent reporting of
lawyers' misconduct to disciplinary authorities); Jeffrey A. Parness,
Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 TENN. L. REV. 37,
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amendments to Rule 11, it is fitting to consider two questions about
the relationship between Rule 11 sanctions against lawyers and
professional discipline against these lawyers for that same conduct.
First, is there any empirical evidence to support a relationship
between Rule 11 sanctions against lawyers and professional
discipline for their litigation conduct? Second, should lawyers face
professional discipline for litigation conduct giving rise to Rule 11
sanctions? The answers to these two questions shed some light on
the role Rule 11 plays and should play in the regulation of the legal
profession.
Part II of this Article explores the history and types of lawyer
regulation and how Rule 11 fits into the scheme of regulating
lawyers for their litigation conduct in federal courts.10 Part III
analyzes the enforcement of the 1993 version of Rule 11 by the
federal courts over the last ten years and the correlation of Rule 11
sanctions and lawyer discipline for the same conduct. The data
collected demonstrate that there is little correlation between Rule 11
sanctions against lawyers and reported cases of disciplinary bodies
imposing discipline on the lawyers for their litigation conduct.
Finally, Part IV evaluates the institutional choices implicit in the
current relationship between Rule 11 and lawyer discipline and
discusses whether there should be more disciplinary sanctions
against lawyers for Rule 11 violations. I argue that the present
institutional choice, which does not require lawyer discipline in
every instance where a federal judge sanctions a lawyer's litigation
conduct, is a wise choice.
44 (1993) [hereinafter Pamess, Disciplinary Referrals] (predicting an increase
in public interest sanctions including disciplinary referrals in light of the 1993
amendments to Rule 11).
10. Although the focus of this article is on Rule 11 and lawyers' litigation
conduct in federal courts, there are provisions similar to Rule 11 in most state
rules. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt.
c, reporter's note 9 (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. It is beyond the scope
of this article to discuss discipline under the state counterparts to Rule 11, or to
explore state analogs to other federal laws, rules, and the inherent power of
federal courts to regulate lawyers' litigation conduct.
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II. RULE 11 AND LAWYER REGULATION
A variety of institutions comprise the current regulatory scheme
for lawyers." Among these are the self-regulatory institutions of the
bar and state supreme courts that oversee bar admissions and lawyer
discipline. Apart from these self-regulatory institutions sit the trial
courts that regulate lawyers' litigation conduct through their inherent
powers and through evidentiary and procedural rules, such as Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The institutional constraints on lawyers'
11. A number of commentators have described this system as increasingly
complex. For example, Professor Ted Schneyer describes lawyer regulation as
consisting of three classes of institutions. See Ted Schneyer, Legal Process
Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 33, 35
(1996). The first class consists of the legal institutions "with broad missions
that include some incidental regulation of lawyers" such as judges and juries
deciding legal malpractice and fee dispute cases, legislators passing antitrust
and consumer protection laws, trial courts regulating lawyers through sanctions
and evidentiary rules, and administrative agencies that promulgate their own
rules for lawyers appearing before them. Id at 35-36. The second class
consists of private institutions that exert influence over lawyers, such as clients
in the legal marketplace regulating fees, law firms with internal policies
affecting partner and associate conduct, watchdog journalists writing about
lawyers, and liability insurers imposing conditions for malpractice coverage.
Id. at 36. The third class of institutions consists of bar organizations, such as
bar associations establishing ethics rules, and bar agencies and disciplinary
counsel, supervised by state supreme courts, that license and discipline lawyers
for violating ethics rules. Id. at 37.
Professor David Wilkins divides the regulation of lawyers into
enforcement systems consisting of "four models: disciplinary controls, liability
controls, institutional controls, and legislative controls." David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799, 805 (1992). The
American Law Institute (ALI) discusses the regulation of lawyers in terms of
"[1]awyer codes and background law," "inherent powers of courts," "role of
bar associations," "[c]ivil remedies," "[p]rocedural and evidence law," and
"[c]riminal law." RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 1, cmt. b-d, f-h.
The multiplicity of institutions and enforcement systems regulating
lawyers' conduct has led Professor Charles Wolfram to describe contemporary
law practice in the United States as a "regulated industry." Charles W.
Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-II
the Modern Era, 15 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 205, 207 (2002). This reliance on a
rule and law approach to regulating lawyers' conduct is not universal. In
Britain, for example, the behavior of barristers and solicitors primarily results
from the "close-knit character of the Bar... [with] many unwritten rules of
professional conduct, and in the tendency for even the written rules to be
enforced largely by peer pressure." Maimon Schwarzschild, Class, National
Character, and the Bar Reforms in Britain: Will There Always Be an
England?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 185, 196 (1994).
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conduct converge with ethics rules promulgated by the bar,
disciplinary systems involving the bar and state supreme courts, trial
courts through their inherent powers, statutes, and rules of procedure
such as Rule 11. The various rules and institutions regulating
lawyers' conduct share the common purpose of prohibiting lawyers
from raising frivolous claims or defenses or otherwise engaging in
abusive litigation. The ways in which they regulate lawyers' conduct
differ, however.
A. Ethics Rules Proscribing Abusive Litigation Conduct
Sociologists and legal commentators point to self-regulation as
one of the defining characteristics of the legal profession. 12 The high
court in each jurisdiction adopts ethics rules, principally based on the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules), 13 and disciplinary authorities enforce the
12. See, e.g., ABA, COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, "..... IN THE SPIRIT OF
PUBLIC SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER
PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986) (defining law as a profession in part because "the
occupation is self-regulating"); Michael J. Powell, Professional Divestiture:
The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer Discipline, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 31, 31-32 (stating that sociologists view self-regulation as a defining
characteristic of a profession).
The term "self-regulation" as used here refers to the fact that the locus
of control over the work of professionals is in the professions
themselves rather than in external agencies. In large part "self-
regulation" designates the formal mechanisms and processes by which
the professions control the admission and behavior of their members.
Id. at 32 n.2.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2002) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. The American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Model Rules in
1983 and has amended them frequently-most recently in 2002. By adopting
the Model Rules, the ABA replaced the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code), which the ABA had adopted in 1969 and
amended in 1980. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]. More than forty states and the District of
Columbia have adopted some version of the Model Rules. See STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS xxvi (2002); RICHARD A. ZITRN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL
ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 6 (2d ed. 2002); ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT § 01:3 (2002) [hereinafter LAWYERS' MANUAL].
Most of the states that have not adopted some version of the Model Rules base
their ethics rules on the Model Code, though usually with some variations. See
ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra, at 6.
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ethics rules through state disciplinary processes.' 4 Courts usually
rely on the prevailing ethics rules to enforce clients' rights against
lawyers, as in motions to disqualify a lawyer due to a conflict of
interest or in actions seeking damages for legal malpractice. 15 And
the ABA maintains the view "that disciplinary agencies operating
under the supervision of state supreme courts should retain primary
responsibility for ensuring that lawyers live up to their professional
obligations."' 6
The ABA Model Rules, which serve as the basis for most state
ethics rules, 17 prohibit lawyers from filing frivolous or unwarranted
claims or defenses. 18 Model Rule 3.1 sets forth the basic rule and
states that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
14. The high court in each state oversees the discipline of lawyers, and the
judiciary's authority to regulate lawyers is firmly established. "[T]hirteen state
constitutions expressly grant the judiciary authority to regulate lawyers[,
and]... state high courts' opinions [are] unanimous that regulation of lawyers
is an inherent judicial function." ABA, COMM'N ON EvALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 2
(1992) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT].
15. Courts often rely on the jurisdiction's ethics rules defining conflicts of
interest when deciding motions to disqualify a lawyer or law firm. See, e.g.,
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753
(2d Cir. 1975) (stating that the ethics rules are the starting point in considering
a motion to disqualify); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Duncan, Weinberg, Miller
& Pembroke, P.C., 986 P.2d 35, 43 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (using ethics rules to
analyze a motion to disqualify absent any argument to the contrary).
Although a violation of an ethics rule alone does not constitute a cause
of action for legal malpractice, proof of an ethics rule violation may be some
evidence in considering the standard of care or duty owed to a client. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Mordkofsky, 901 F.2d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that
violations of the ethics rules "certainly constitute evidence" in a malpractice
action); Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719,
721-22 (Ga. 1995) (considering the violation of an ethics rule as evidence in a
malpractice action); Krischbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291, 1301 (Ohio
1991) (stating that "norms of behavior expressed in the Code of Professional
Responsibility are directly' relevant" to the standard of care in legal
malpractice).
16. Wilkins, supra note 11, at 802. See also Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four
Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure" of
Law Firms, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 245, 266-67 (1998) (noting that the ABA often
resists administrative agency attempts to regulate lawyers).
17. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 13, at xxvi.
18. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 3.1.
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fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law." 19 Under Rule 3.1, a comment explains that a lawyer has a
"duty not to abuse legal procedure," and that "in determining the
proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's
ambiguities and potential for change" but that "both procedural and
substantive" law "establish[] the limits within which an advocate
may proceed., 20 Another comment notes that lawyers must "inform
themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable
law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in
support of their clients' positions" even if lawyers have not first
"fully substantiated" the facts in a claim or defense.
2 1
Other Model Rules that regulate lawyers' conduct in this area
include: Rule 1.1, requiring competent representation;22 Rule 3.2,
mandating reasonable efforts to expedite litigation;23 Rule 3.3,
requiring candor toward the tribunal;24 Rule 3.4(d), prohibiting
19. Id. Lawyers have been disciplined professionally for violating state
ethics rules based on Model Rule 3.1. See, e.g., In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d
910, 919-20 (Mo. 1997) (disbarring a lawyer for pursuing claims after it
became apparent that they were not supported by the facts); In re Jackson, 682
N.E.2d 526, 529-30 (Ind. 1997) (suspending a lawyer from the practice of law
for no less than three years for making false claims and pursuing a claim that
had been previously litigated to finality in prior lawsuits); In re Plunkett, 432
N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn. 1988) (issuing a public reprimand for a lawyer
bringing a frivolous lawsuit).
20. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 3.1 cmt. 1.
21. Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 2.
22. "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Id. R. 1.1.
23. "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
with the interests of the client." Id. R. 3.2.
24. Rule 3.3 provides that, among other things, "[a] lawyer shall not
knowingly... make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal
by the lawyer." Id. R. 3.3(a)(1). A comment to Rule 3.3 states that the
"advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for
litigation," and "an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge,
as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly
be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be
true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry." Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 3.
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frivolous discovery requests and practices; 25 Rule 4.4, prohibiting a
lawyer from engaging in conduct that has "no substantial purpose
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person;" 26 and Rule
8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is
"prejudicial to the administration of justice."
2 7
The Model Code,2 8 which preceded the Model Rules, also
contains several provisions proscribing certain types of lawyers'
litigation conduct. The basic provision is DR 7-102, which states:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a
trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing law, except that he may
advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.
29
In addition to DR 7-102(A), other Model Code provisions that
regulate lawyers' litigation conduct include: DR 1-102(A)(4),
25. Rule 3.4 requires a lawyer to deal fairly with the opposing party and
counsel stating that "[a] lawyer shall not... make a frivolous discovery
request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally
proper discovery request by an opposing party." Id. R. 3.4(d).
26. Id. R. 4.4. "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of
such a person." Id.
27. Id. R. 8.4(d). "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice... ." Id.
28. MODEL CODE, supra note 13.
29. Id. DR 7-102(A). Lawyers have been professionally disciplined for
violating state ethics rules based on this Model Code provision. See, e.g., Iowa
Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Conduct v. Ronwin, 523 N.W.2d 515, 557 (Iowa 1996)
(revoking attorney's license to practice law for filing lawsuits meant to harass
and maliciously injure others); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v.
Zakrzewski, 560 N.W.2d 150, 157 (Neb. 1997) (suspending lawyer from
practice of law for eighteen months for failing to investigate a matter and filing
a false affidavit); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Finneran, 687 N.E.2d 405, 408 (Ohio
1997) (imposing an indefinite suspension from the practice of law against a
lawyer for using dilatory tactics and for voluntarily dismissing cases then
serially refiling them in an attempt to generate acceptable settlement offers).
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prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation; 3° DR 1-102(A)(5), prohibiting conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice;31 DR 1-102(A)(6),
prohibiting a lawyer's "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law;" 32 DR 6-101(A)(1), forbidding a lawyer from
handling a matter the lawyer is not competent to handle;33 DR 6-
101(A)(2), 3 prohibiting handling a matter without adequate
preparation;3 and DR 7-106(C)(7), prohibiting a lawyer from
intentionally or habitually violating a rule of procedure or evidence.
35
The most common forms of discipline and sanctions for
violating applicable ethics rules are public or private reprimands,
probation, suspension, and disbarment. 36 The ABA Model Rules for
30. "A lawyer shall not... [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 1-
102(A)(4).
31. "A lawyer shall not... [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice." Id. DR 1-102(A)(5).
32. Id. DR 1-102(A)(6).
33. "A lawyer shall not... [hiandle a legal matter which he knows or
should know that he is not competent to handle... ." Id. DR 6-101 (A)(1).
34. "A lawyer shall not... [h]andle a legal matter without preparation
adequate in the circumstances." Id. DR 6-101 (A)(2).
35. "In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer
shall not... [i]ntentionally or habitually violate any established rule of
procedure or of evidence." Id. DR 7-106(C)(7).
36. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 13, § 101:3001. The Lawyers' Manual
also lists fines and costs as other sanctions. Id. However, while the current
ABA Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement do not list fines, they do list
costs. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10(A)(7)
(2001). The ABA previously discouraged the use of fines. See Leslie C.
Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 77 (1998). The
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility has a National Discipline Data
Bank, which collects statistics on the various sanctions imposed. The Data
Bank does not have information on private reprimands because they are not
reported. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 13, § 101:3002.
The ABA also administers a Survey on Lawyer Discipline by sending
questionnaires to lawyer disciplinary agencies. ABA Standing Comm. on
Prof'l Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline (2000), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/toc_2000.html (last visited Sept. 27,
2003) [hereinafter Survey on Lawyer Discipline]. The disciplinary agencies in
Idaho and Montana did not respond, and some states provided only partial data
in response to the survey in 2000. The data show that the lawyer disciplinary
agencies had jurisdiction over 1,207,076 lawyers, that 114,281 complaints
were received by the reporting agencies during 2000, and that 32,302
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Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement state that the highest priority of
discipline and lawyer regulation based on the applicable ethics rules
is "to deter unethical behavior." 37  In addition, the ABA Model
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions state that "[t]he purpose of
lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the
administration of justice from lawyers" who are failing "to discharge
their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and
the legal profession." 38  Courts and disciplinary authorities often
characterize four goals for lawyer discipline: (1) "protect the
complaints were pending from the prior year. Id. chart I. The agencies
reported that they dismissed 57,247 complaints for lack of jurisdiction and
investigated 90,359 complaints. Id. Of the complaints investigated, the
agencies dismissed 42,126 after investigation, found that 7050 of the
complaints warranted filing of formal charges, and ultimately charged 3360
lawyers with formal complaints. Id. Some of the lawyers charged with formal
complaints may have had more than one complaint warranting formal charges
pending against them, and some of the complaints warranting formal charges
may have been resolved with private sanctions or through some other
mechanism, such as permitting the lawyer to resign from the practice of law
prior to the filing of a formal charge. Telephone Interview with Ellyn S.
Rosen, Associate Regulation Counsel, ABA Center for Professional
Responsibility (Nov. 17,2003).
Disciplinary agencies imposed some form of private sanction in 2734
matters, and public sanctions in a total of 4010 matters. Survey on Lawyer
Discipline, supra, chart II. Thus, private sanctions comprise nearly 41% of all
discipline imposed on lawyers. With regard to public discipline, the
disciplinary agencies reported that 1719 lawyers were suspended from the
practice of law, 856 received public reprimands, admonitions, or censures, 625
were placed on probation, 486 were involuntarily disbarred, 443 consented to
disbarments, and 307 received interim suspensions due to the risk of potential
harm to clients or the lawyers' criminal convictions. Id.
Several agencies did not report the average time necessary from receipt
of a complaint to imposition of a sanction, but those reporting the timeframes
indicated a wide range-from a low of three months (Iowa, Kentucky, and
North Dakota) to a high of nearly three years (Alaska). Id. chart V. Of those
reporting, the average length of time from receipt of a complaint to imposition
of a sanction was nearly one year. See id.
37. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note
36, R. 1 cmt. The Restatement notes that lawyer discipline operates not only
"specifically to deter future wrongful conduct seemingly threatened by the
lawyer found to have violated mandatory rules" but also "to deter wrongful
conduct by other lawyers." RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 5 introductory
note.
38. ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS: BLACK LETTER RULES AND
COMMENTARY 9 (1992).
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public," (2) "protect the integrity of the legal system and ensure the
administration of justice," (3) "deter future unethical conduct and,
where appropriate, rehabilitate the lawyer," and (4) "educate other
lawyers and the public" and deter unethical conduct by other
lawyers.
39
The disciplinary authority of the jurisdiction where the lawyer is
admitted to practice has jurisdiction over the lawyer, but the lawyer
may be subject to discipline both where the lawyer is admitted to
practice and in any other jurisdiction where alleged unethical
conduct occurs.40 Federal courts usually adopt the ethics rules of the
state where the court sits,4 1 and federal courts exercise authority
39. Id. Some commentators have noted that in addition to deterrence,
courts and disciplinary authorities focus on three purposes for lawyer
discipline: protect the public, maintain the integrity and standards of the legal
profession, and preserve public confidence in the legal profession. See, e.g.,
Stephen G. Bend, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to
Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 907, 912 & 912 n.18 (1991)
(citing these three justifications for lawyer discipline in a study of attorney
discipline cases); Levin, supra note 36, at 17 (citing these three reasons in
several cases).
40. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 8.5(a); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 10, § 1. The Model Code does not contain a provision dealing with
disciplinary authority and choice of law issues. See CENTER FOR PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 641
tbl. A (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
41. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 1; cf Carlsen v. Thomas, 159 F.R.D.
661, 663 n.2 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (noting that not all federal courts adopt the ethics
rules of the states where the courts sit). Professors Judith McMorrow and
Daniel Coquillette surveyed the ninety-four federal district courts and found:
[T]here are five districts (5%) that have no local rules governing
attorney conduct. Eighty-two districts (87%) have local rules that
adopt the state standards of the relevant state. A large group, 62
districts (66%), have local rules that adopt state standards when the
state has adopted some form of the ABA Model Rules of 1983. There's
another group of 14 districts (15%) that also adopt state standards, but
where the relevant state still refers to the ABA Model Code of
1969 .... In addition, the four California districts refer to the unique
California Rules of Professional Conduct, and two Illinois districts
adopt a state version of the ABA model rules that also adopted many
standards from the old ABA code, while a third, the N.D. Illinois, its
own "rules of preferred conduct."
JUDITH A. MCMORROW & DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, THE FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT § 802.01 (3d ed.
2001) (citations omitted). McMorrow and Coquillette also prepared a chart
Winter 20041
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pursuant to statutes, rules, and their inherent powers to regulate the
conduct of lawyers appearing before them.
B. Statutes, Inherent Judicial Power, and Court Rules Proscribing
Abusive Litigation Conduct
Although state ethics rules based on the Model Rules or Model
Code heavily proscribe certain lawyers' conduct in litigation, there
are also various federal statutes, inherent judicial power of the courts,
and court rules aimed at preventing groundless litigation and
punishing lawyers who engage in it. In terms of applicable federal
statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 governs litigation conduct at the trial
level; it states that any lawyer in federal court "who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.'
4 3
Additionally, in federal appellate courts, lawyers must not only
follow § 1927 but also 28 U.S.C. § 1912, which provides: "Where a
judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the
court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just
damages for his delay, and single or double costs.
'"4
Federal courts also rely on their inherent powers to regulate
lawyers' litigation conduct, which include "the inherent power to
evaluate the professional conduct of attorneys practicing before
them, and to sanction unprofessional conduct.' As one court
observed, "The most prominent of the court's inherent powers is...
listing the various rules of professional conduct in the district courts. See id. §
802.06.
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 1 cmt. c; see Jeffrey A. Parness,
Enforcing Professional Norms for Federal Litigation Conduct: Achieving
Reciprocal Cooperation, 60 ALB. L. REv. 303, 305 (1996) [hereinafter
Parness, Reciprocal Cooperation].
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2003).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (2003).
45. Carlsen, 159 F.R.D. at 663; see also Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821) ("Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to
be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and
decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. .. .");
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) ("[I]n narrowly
defined circumstances federal courts have inherent power to assess attorney's
fees against counsel.").
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the power to hold.., a lawyer... in contempt. 46 In addition to
contempt powers, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts
have the power to control lawyer admissions to practice in federal
courts and to discipline lawyers appearing before them.47  This
inherent power includes the authority to assess attorneys' fees and
expenses.
4 8
As discussed previously, federal district courts usually adopt the
state ethics rules where the court sits.49 This practice results in a
wide variety of ethics rules governing attorney conduct in federal
district courts. On the other hand, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 46 (Rule 46)50 sets forth one set of standards concerning
attorney admissions, suspensions, and disbarment for all thirteen
circuit courts. Yet, instead of solely relying on Rule 46's "conduct
unbecoming a member of the court's bar" as a standard for lawyer
discipline, 51 many courts of appeals have used their authority under
28 U.S.C. § 2071 to adopt local rules.52 The local rules differ from
one court of appeals to another and are often inconsistent.53
46. Schutts v. Bently Nev. Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1549, 1561 (D. Nev. 1997)
(citing Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873)). The contempt
power of courts has been called "ancient," and courts use contempt power to
keep court proceedings orderly. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 2.2.2 (1986).
47. In 1824 the Court recognized that in order to preserve "the
respectability of the bar" and to preserve "harmony with the bench," there was
power "incidental to all Courts" to control attorney admissions and to
discipline lawyers. Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530-31 (1824). See
In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) ("Courts have long recognized an
inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers.").
48. In Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991), the Court held that
a district court "properly invoked its inherent power in assessing as a sanction
for a party's bad-faith conduct attorney's fees and related expenses paid by the
party's opponent to its attorneys."
49. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
50. FED. R. APP. P. 46.
51. Rule 46 states:
A court of appeals may discipline an attorney who practices before it
for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply
with any court rule. First, however, the court must afford the attorney
reasonable notice, an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and, if
requested, a hearing.
Id.
52. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules
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In addition to their inherent powers, § 1912, Rule 46, and any
local rules a circuit court may have adopted, federal courts of appeals
may also rely on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 (Rule 38)1
4
to address the issue of frivolous appeals. Rule 38 states: "If a court
of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a
separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable
opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double
costs to the appellee."
55
Finally, at the trial level, district courts have available and use
Rule 11 to control attorney conduct associated with bringing
frivolous cases.
C. Rule 11 's Role in Controlling Lawyers 'Litigation Conduct
Rule 11 was a little used federal rule until it was amended in
1983 to provide for a more meaningful system of sanctions for
frivolous filings.56  Under the pre-1983 Rule 11, 57 a lawyer's
shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure
prescribed under section 2072 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2003). Long
before there was statutory authority for circuit courts to adopt rules regulating
lawyers' conduct, the Supreme Court recognized that "Circuit Courts, as well
as all other Federal courts, have authority to make and establish all necessary
rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such rules
are not repugnant to the laws of the United States." Heckers v. Fowler, 69
U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128 (1864).
53. MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 41, § 803.02; see also id. §
803.08 (containing a chart specifying the rules of professional conduct in the
various circuits).
54. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
55. Id.
56. See JEROLD S. SOLOVY & CHARLES M. SHAFFER, JR., RULE 11 AND
OTHER SANcTIONs: NEW ISSUES IN FEDERAL LITIGATION 15 (1987). "Since
its original promulgation, Rule 11 has provided for the striking of pleadings
and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in the signing of
pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
The original Rule 11 however was not effective in deterring abuses. Id. See
supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (noting that the original version of
Rule 11 was rarely used to sanction lawyers). See also Vairo, supra note 5, at
596 (stating that the pre-1983 version of Rule 11 "was largely ignored").
57. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (1982) (effective Sept. 16, 1938) (current version at
FED. R. CIV. P. 11). The 1938 version of Rule 11 provided:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
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signature on a pleading certified that there was good cause for the
pleading and that it was not brought for the purpose of delay.58 This
earlier version of Rule 11, in effect fiom 1938 until the 1983
amendments, was criticized "on the grounds that 'good cause' was
poorly defined and that other abuses, such as litigation intended to
harass or to force the opposing party to incur unnecessary expenses,
were not prohibited."5 9
In response to these concerns, as well as growing complaints
among lawyers, judges, and the public over frivolous litigation, the
Advisory Committee amended Rule 11 in 1983.60 The 1983 version
shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances
is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is
not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been
served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similarly action may be
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Id.
58. "The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." Id.
59. SOLOVY & SHAFFER, supra note 56, at 17.
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (Supp. IV 1986) (effective Aug. 1, 1983) (current
version at FED. R. CIv. P. 11). The 1983 version of Rule 11 provided:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other
paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances
is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
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of Rule 11 expanded the significance of the lawyer's signature to
require an affirmative duty upon the lawyer to conduct a "reasonable
[prefiling] inquiry" demonstrating that the filing "is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."' In addition,
the signature certified that the filing "is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation.,
62
The changes to Rule 11 proved to be significant. First, a
"reasonable inquiry" or objective standard replaced the "good faith"
or subjective standard of the old version of Rule 11.63 Second, the
amended version of Rule 11 expanded the improper purposes for
filing to include "any improper purpose" and not just delay.64 Third,
the 1983 version of Rule 11 required the judge to sanction the
offending lawyer for violating Rule 11 rather than leaving discretion
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,




63. The 1983 version of Rule 11 stated:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. Indeed, the 1983 version of Rule 11 specifically noted that filings "to
harass" or cause "needless increase in the cost of litigation" were examples of
improper purposes in addition to filings designed to delay litigation. Id.
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with the judge for imposing discipline on a lawyer as stated in the
old version of the rule.65 These changes combined to expand the
scope of Rule 11 violations to make them easier to prove, and to
require a sanction for every violation. As a result, Rule 11 sanctions
became more commonplace, and the threat or use of Rule 11
sanctions spawned "[m]eetings and publications of lawyers, judges,
and academics.., filled with 'war stories' and analyses" that either
praised or criticized Rule 11.66
As Professor Georgene Vairo has pointed out, at least one thing
is certain about the 1983 version of Rule 1 1-every empirical study
showed that the amended version caused lawyers to "stop and think"
and engage in "significantly more prefiling research than they had
before Rule 11 was amended., 67 The 1983 version of Rule 11 also
began to take up a significant portion of lawyers' energies and court
deliberations. One multi-circuit study found that in a one-year
period nearly 25% of lawyers who practiced in federal court had
been involved in cases in which Rule 11 motions or show cause
orders had been filed but did not lead to sanctions, and nearly 8%
had been involved in cases where judges imposed sanctions. 8 In
addition, this study found that during the same one-year period over
30% of lawyers had received out-of-court threats of sanctions and
nearly 25% had received in-court threats of sanctions in cases where
no formal Rule 11 sanctions requests or procedures were initiated.69
Understandably, the threats and sanctions took a toll on lawyer
relations. A Federal Judicial Center study in 1991 demonstrated that
over 50% of the 483 federal judges responding to the survey believed
that Rule 11 motions "exacerbate unnecessarily contentious behavior
65. The 1983 version of Rule 11 stated:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Id. (emphasis added).
66. Lawrence C. Marshall et al., Public Policy: The Use and Impact of Rule
11, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 943, 943 (1992).
67. Vairo, supra note 5, at 621.
68. Marshall et al., supra note 66, at 952.
69. Id. at 955-56.
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of counsel toward one another., 70  Similarly, a 1992 study by the
American Judicature Society (AJS) found that 64% of the lawyers
surveyed thought that Rule 11 had caused a decline in lawyer
civility.
71
Responding to these and other studies and complaints about
Rule 11, the Advisory Committee wrote a 1992 report in which it
found that "widespread criticisms of the 1983 version of the rule,
though frequently exaggerated or premised on faulty assumptions,
were not without some merit.",72  The Advisory Committee
concluded that in many ways the 1983 version was
counterproductive to promoting efficient and ethical litigation
conduct, and it proposed amendments designed to correct some of
the problems and inefficiencies.
73
Among its changes, the 1993 version of Rule 11 provided that
the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is solely the deterrence of
70. Vairo, supra note 5, at 627 (citing ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL.,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 9-10 (1991)).
71. Marshall et al., supra note 66, at 964.
72. Letter to Honorable Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523 (1993).
73. After receiving comments on Rule 11 and reviewing data from studies
and surveys, the Advisory Committee found:
[T]here was support for the following propositions: (1) Rule 11, in
conjunction with other rules, has tended to impact plaintiffs more
frequently and severely than defendants; (2) it occasionally has
created problems for a party which seeks to assert novel legal
contentions or which needs discovery from other persons to determine
if the party's belief about the facts can be supported with evidence; (3)
it has too rarely been enforced through nonmonetary sanctions, with
cost-shifting having become the normative sanction; (4) it provides
little incentive, and perhaps a disincentive, for a party to abandon
positions after determining they are no longer supportable in fact or
law; and (5) it sometimes has produced unfortunate conflicts between
attorney and client, and exacerbated contentious behavior between
counsel. In addition, although the great majority of Rule 11 motions
have not been granted, the time spent by litigants and the courts in
dealing with such motions has not been insignificant.
The Committee then drafted a proposed amendment with the
objective of increasing the fairness and effectiveness of the rule as a
means to deter presentation and maintenance of frivolous positions,
while also reducing the frequency of Rule 11 motions.
Id. at 523.
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objectionable filings,74  made the imposition of sanctions
discretionary,75 provided a "safe harbor" against sanctions for filings
that are withdrawn,76 permitted the filing of factual allegations
without evidentiary support at the time of filing provided they were
likely to have evidentiary support after discovery,77 and removed
discovery activity from the scope of the rule." The Advisory
Committee's note emphasized that a "court has available a variety of
possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the
offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure;
requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs;
ordering a fine payable to the court; [and] referring the matter to
disciplinary authorities."
79
A few years after the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, the Federal
Judicial Center surveyed judges and lawyers for their views on the
effects of the amendments.80 Among the issues surveyed, the
74. "A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c)(2).
75. "If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys,
law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for
the violation." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c).
76. In describing how a Rule 11 proceeding is initiated, Rule 11 provides:
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It... shall not be filed with or
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the
motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is
not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
77. The 1993 version of Rule 11 states that "the allegations and other
factual contentions [must] have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery." FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b)(3).
78. Rule 11 labels subdivision (d) "Inapplicability to Discovery," and it
states that "[s]ubdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are
subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37." FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (d).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
80. JOHN SHAPARD ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF A
SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1
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questionnaires asked whether Rule 11 should be modified to better
deter groundless filings,8' and whether sanctions should be
mandatory rather than discretionary.8 2  Of those responding, the
largest percentages-52% of judges, 41% of plaintiffs' attorneys,
37% of defendants' attorneys, and 40% of other attorneys-stated
that Rule 11 "is just right as it now stands. 8 3  With regard to
discretion in sanctioning, only 22% of judges, 24% of plaintiffs'
lawyers, 27% of defendants' lawyers, and 25% of other lawyers
stated that a "court should be required to impose a sanction when a
violation is found.,
8 4
Whether or not one agrees with the majority of judges or
lawyers responding to the 1995 Federal Judicial Center survey that
the current version of Rule 11 does not need further amendments, the
1993 version of Rule 11 is regulating lawyers' conduct. In some
respects, Rule 11 sanctions have an advantage over professional
discipline systems because Rule 11 holds lawyers directly
accountable for many of their actions in pending federal litigation.
In this way, Rule 11 serves as an internal control mechanism, much
like the inherent judicial power of contempt, to identify and correct
lawyers' misconduct where it happens and close in time to when it
happens. Yet, the same conduct that gives rise to Rule 11 sanctions
may serve as the basis for discipline by disciplinary agencies.
Because of this possibility, and because disciplinary referrals were
contemplated by the Advisory Committee, at least one commentator
predicted more disciplinary referrals,8 5 and another has argued for
more disciplinary referrals, even in instances where lawyers are not
(1995). Questionnaires were mailed to representative samples of 148 federal
district court judges and 1130 federal trial attorneys. Id.
81. The questionnaire asked survey participants if, given other federal
statutes, rules, and inherent judicial authority regulating lawyers' conduct,
"[b]ased on your view of how effective or ineffective those other methods are,
how, if at all, should Rule 11 be modified?" Id. app. B, 14.
82. "Should the court be required to impose a monetary or nonmonetary
sanction when a violation is found?" Id. app. B at 13.
83. Id. at 7, tbl. 7. Smaller percentages of respondents-32% of the judges,
11% of the plaintiffs' lawyers, 37% of the defendants' lawyers, and 24% of
other attorneys--stated that Rule 11 "should be modified to increase its
effectiveness in deterring groundless filings (even at the expense of deterring
some meritorious filings)." Id.
84. Id. at 6, tbl. 5.
85. See Parness, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 9, at 38-39, 44-47.
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sanctioned under Rule 11 because they have availed themselves of
the safe harbor provision by withdrawing the suspect filing.
86
Setting aside for the moment the question of whether lawyers
should face discipline for their federal litigation conduct that triggers
a Rule 11 sanction, the next part of this article examines whether
there is empirical evidence demonstrating a relationship between
Rule 11 sanctions against lawyers and professional discipline for
their litigation conduct.
III. THE USE OF RULE 11 AND SUBSEQUENT PROFESSIONAL
DISCIPLINE
Several challenges exist to investigating the use of Rule 11
sanctions. There are no reporting requirements for the federal courts
to track and report the use of Rule 11, so researchers must use
surveys of lawyers and judges, research actual court dockets, or rely
on electronic database searches to understand the uses of Rule 11.
Of these common investigation routes, researching electronic
databases is the lowest cost, quickest, and easiest method to capture
data, but there are many problems with analyzing Rule 11 activity by
researching cases on electronic databases.
First, not all cases involving Rule 11 result in published
opinions or unreported opinions appearing on electronic databases.
For example, one circuit study found that less than 40% of Rule 11
cases are available on electronic databases.8 7
Second, when one conducts an electronic database search for
Rule 11 cases, the number of reported cases citing "Rule 11" is likely
to be greater than the number of cases in which Civil Rule 11
sanctions are interpreted or applied.8  Searching for federal cases
citing to "Rule 11" will identify cases in which Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 is cited merely as dicta, as well as those cases citing to
86. See Brown, supra note 9, at 1593-96, 1604-13.
87. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 59.
88. Professor Georgene Vairo found 6947 cases citing "Rule 11" when she
conducted the following search of LEXIS: "Genfed Library, Courts File (Oct.
20, 1998) (search for sanction! and (Fed. R. Civ. P. I 1 or Rule 11) and date (aft
1983) and date (bef 6/1993))." Vairo, supra note 5, at 626 n.259. Although
this search strategy found every reported case citing "Rule 11" in the database,
there is no way of knowing why Rule 11 was cited without looking at each
case.
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every other tVe of Rule 11, such as Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11, which has nothing to do with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.90
Given the inherent problems with electronic database searches,
researching court dockets is a more accurate method for identifying
actual motions or judicial orders referencing Rule 11. Searching the
thousands of cases filed each year in over one hundred federal
district courts and federal circuit courts,91 however, is a more time
89. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
90. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 outlines the types of pleas
available to and rights of a criminal defendant entering a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere. See id.
In researching for this article, I replicated Professor Vairo's search for
the same period and found 7037 cases. Search of LEXIS, Federal Court Cases
Combined (Sept. 25, 2003) (search for sanction! and (Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 or Rule
11) and date(geq (01/01/1984) and leq (06/01/1993)). A further modification
of the search revealed that 294 of the 7037 cases identified with the original
search were likely criminal cases. Search of LEXIS, Federal Court Cases
Combined (Sept. 25, 2003) (search for sanction! and (Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 or Rule
11) and criminal and name (state or (u.s. or united states)) and date(geq
(01/01/1984) and leq (06/01/1993)). Most of the criminal cases cited to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson,
993 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that court abused its discretion
and violated Rule of Criminal Procedure 11); United States v. Cholak, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 514, at *3 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 in the facts); United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1078 (4th
Cir. 1992) (discussing Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in the facts). Some of
the criminal cases did cite to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1013 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in dicta); United States v. Dickstein, 971 F.2d 446,
450 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in dicta).
The modified search, however, was not successful in identifying only
criminal cases because it yielded some civil cases relying on or citing to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See, e.g., New York State Nat'l Org. for
Women v. Terry, 961 F.2d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 sanctions); Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Lady Balt. Foods, Inc., 960 F.2d 1339, 1347 (7th Cir.
1992) (analogizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11).
The modified search also identified ninety more cases than Vairo did in
1998. The additional cases are likely the result of more cases being added to
LEXIS because of changes to the database since 1998.
91. There are eighty-nine federal district courts in the fifty states, five
additional district courts for territories and the District of Columbia, and
thirteen federal circuit courts. U.S. Courts, The Federal Judiciary, Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2003).
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consuming and expensive enterprise. Furthermore, searching the
dockets will not reveal implied or explicit threats of use of Rule 11,
which some researchers want to investigate. 92 Given the limitations
of using electronic databases and actual court dockets, some
researchers prefer sampling lawyers to investigate various features of
Rule 11 activity.
93
Some aspects of Rule 11 activity are amenable to electronic
database searches, however. Although electronic database searches
of reported cases are both underinclusive and overinclusive to some
investigations, there are ways to control for some of the
overinclusiveness issues. For example, some search strategies are
better at identifying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 cases, 94 and
reviewing the case decisions a search produces can identify those in
which courts impose sanctions on lawyers for their litigation
conduct.
In the following subsections, I discuss the total number of
reported cases citing the 1993 version of Rule 11 for the past ten
years and identify the much smaller number in which lawyers or
lawyers and their clients are sanctioned. Next, I investigate the
frequency with which federal courts explicitly make disciplinary
referrals of lawyers for their conduct. Finally, I examine the
correlation between reported disciplinary cases and Rule 11 cases in
which lawyers are sanctioned and the correlation between cases in
which courts make explicit disciplinary referrals pursuant to Rule 11
and reported disciplinary cases resulting from the referrals.
A. Reported Rule 11 Cases Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Pursuant to
the 1993 Amendments: 1993-2003
Despite the difficulties of using electronic databases for
researching issues concerning the use of Rule 11 sanctions, the data
92. See Marshall et al., supra note 66, at 951-56.
93. Id.
94. For example, a search for "Rule 11" will identify other types of Rule
11, such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. See supra notes 88-90.
However, limiting the search to commonly used forms of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, such as "Fed. R. Civ. P. 11," "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11," and "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11," will limit the results to just
those cases citing to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See infra notes 95,
97, and accompanying text for a discussion of the search strategy used for this
article.
Winter 2004]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:765
from those searches do tell a story that is useful in understanding the
interplay between Rule 11 sanctions and lawyers' discipline for the
same conduct. A search of computerized databases for cases decided
from the adoption of the amendments to Rule 11 in 1993 until July of
2003 revealed 2171 cases that cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 and also contained iterations of the words "sanction" or
"discipline" in close proximity to the various words for "lawyer."
95
An examination of the cases citing to Rule 11 based on circuit-
specific searches revealed the following:
9 6
95. Search of Westlaw, Federal Judicial Circuit, all cases by circuit (search:
da (aft 12/01/1993) & da (bef 07/01/2003) & (((rule) (fed.r.civ.p.) ("federal
rule of civil procedure") ("federal rules of civil procedure") /1 11) ("federal
rule of civil procedure 11") ("federal rules of civil procedure 11") ("fed rules
civ. proc. rule 11") ("fed.r.civ.p. 11") /s (attorney counsel lawyer) /s (sanct!
disciplin!)). This search revealed the following: First Circuit, Sept. 18, 2003,
identified 86 cases; Second Circuit, Sept. 19, 2003, identified 543 cases; Third
Circuit, Aug. 1, 2003, identified 207 cases; Fourth Circuit, July 30, 2003,
identified 113 cases; Fifth Circuit, July 28, 2003, identified 209 cases; Sixth
Circuit, July 24, 2003, identified 155 cases; Seventh Circuit, July 14, 2003,
identified 285 cases; Eighth Circuit, July 11, 2003, identified 73 cases; Ninth
Circuit, Aug. 1, 2003, identified 229 cases; Tenth Circuit, Aug. 1, 2003,
identified 125 cases; Eleventh Circuit, Aug. 1, 2003, identified 92 cases; D.C.
Circuit, Sept. 18, 2003, identified 36 cases; Federal Circuit, Sept. 18, 2003,
identified 18 cases. A search of all of the circuits combined made toward the
end of the data collection revealed a total of 2176 cases, or five more cases
than the individual circuit searches. Search of Westlaw, All Federal Cases
(Sept. 17, 2003) (search: da (aft 12/01/1993) & da (bef 07/01/2003) & (((rule)
(fed.r.civ.p.) ("federal rule of civil procedure") ("federal rules of civil
procedure") /1 11) ("federal rule of civil procedure 11") ("federal rules of civil
procedure 11 ") ("fed rules civ. proc. rule 11") ("fed.r.civ.p. 11") /s (attorney
counsel lawyer) /s (sanct! disciplin!)) (revealing 2176 cases). The five
additional cases were likely added to the database after some of the earlier
circuit searches were completed because recently decided cases are being
added to the databases as they become available. Telephone Interview with
Cheryl Johnson, Research Attorney, Westlaw (Oct. 7, 2003).
To put the number of Rule 11 cases identified for this article into
context, consider that a Westlaw Keycite search of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 within the same timefarame identified 5496 cases. Id. Therefore,
the total number of cases citing to Rule 11 during the timeframe in question is
slightly more than two and one-half times greater than the number of Rule 11
cases that discuss some form of the words "sanction" or "discipline" in close
proximity to "attorney," "counsel," or "lawyer."
96. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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Circuit District Court Circuit Court Total Cases
First 69 17 86
Second 470 73 543
Third 180 27 207
Fourth 69 44 113
Fifth 78 131 209
Sixth 78 77 155
Seventh 206 79 285
Eighth 44 29 73
Ninth 103 126 229
Tenth 79 46 125
Eleventh 70 22 92
D.C. 27 9 36
Federal 0 18 18
Total Cases 1473 698 2171
Further examination of the cases by reading each case reveals
that a much smaller number of cases citing to Rule 11 involved
imposing Rule 11 sanctions on lawyers or parties. Of the 1473
district court cases citing to Rule 11, trial judges imposed sanctions
on lawyers or lawyers and parties in only 274 cases and imposed
sanctions solely on parties in ninety-two additional cases.97 The
circuit-by-circuit breakdown follows: 98
97. In analyzing the cases, those cases based on the 1983 version of Rule 11
but decided after December 1, 1993, the effective date of the 1993 version of
Rule 11, were not counted. Although Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9011 ("Rule 9011") and Rule 11 are analogous, bankruptcy cases involving
Rule 9011 were excluded because they were not explicitly Rule 11 cases. See,
e.g., In re Armwood, 175 B.R. 779, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (sanctioning
attorney using Rule 9011). Bankruptcy cases that relied on Rule 11 either
solely or in conjunction with Rule 9011 were included. See, e.g., In re Rogers,
239 B.R. 318, 322 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1999) (sanctioning attorney using Rule
11).
98. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. A review of each case
identified in the initial electronic search produced the smaller numbers of cases
that involved Rule 11 sanctions against lawyers, against lawyers and parties, or
solely against parties.
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Circuit District Court Total
Cases
Lawyer or Lawyer Solely Party Sanction
and Party Sanctioned Sanctioned Cases
First 20 1 21
Second 70 16 86
Third 28 9 37
Fourth 12 10 22
Fifth 23 14 37
Sixth 17 8 25
Seventh 37 10 47
Eighth 8 2 10
Ninth 26 10 36
Tenth 12 3 15
Eleventh 19 9 28
D.C. 2 0 2
Federal 0 0 0
Total Cases 274 92 366
Similarly, further examination of the Rule 11 cases at the circuit
level reveals that, of the 698 circuit court cases citing Rule 11 during
the ten year period, only 437 of the cases actually involved matters in
which lawyers and parties were sanctioned or in which there were
appeals challenging the trial court decisions not to impose Rule 11
sanctions. Of these cases, the circuit courts affirmed the trial courts'
decisions in 310 cases, reversed in sixty-six cases, and took other
action, such as remanding or vacating trial court decisions, in sixty-
one cases.99 The circuit-by-circuit breakdown appears in Appendix
A.
99. These cases, in which the courts took a variety of actions other than
affirming or reversing, are coded as "other" in Appendix A. The cases are
difficult to categorize because there are many different reasons the courts used
for remanding or vacating trial court decisions. For example, in one case, the
Second Circuit vacated sanctions imposed on a party and remanded with
instructions to the district court to decide whether sanctions should have been
imposed upon counsel. United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003). Another example is
vacating because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 procedural
notice requirements. Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761,
767-68 (4th Cir. 2003). Some other examples include vacating sanctions
because a grant of summary judgment had been vacated, Ottiano v. Credit Data
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Further analysis of the cases reveals that the circuit courts
affirmed sanctions against lawyers in 170 cases0 0 and against parties
in fifty-eight cases while affirming decisions to deny sanctions
against lawyers in twenty-four cases and against parties in fifty-eight
cases. During the period in question, circuit courts reversed
decisions imposing sanctions on lawyers in fifty-two cases and on
parties in ten cases, and reversed decisions denying sanctions against
lawyers in two cases and against parties in two cases. The circuit-
by-circuit breakdown appears in Appendix B.
The foregoing analyses of reported Rule 11 cases involving
lawyer sanctions tell a partial story. The data illustrate the frequency
of Rule 11 sanctions against lawyers, but they do not provide us with
information about disciplinary referrals under Rule 11, nor
professional discipline against lawyers for the conduct underlying
their Rule 11 sanctions. The next two sections explore the
correlations between reported Rule 11 cases and professional
discipline against the lawyers receiving Rule 11 sanctions.
B. Reported Cases Including Disciplinary Referrals as Part of Rule
11 Sanctions
There are very few reported cases including disciplinary
referrals as part of Rule 11 sanctions. A search of computerized
databases for cases decided from the adoption of amendments to
Rule 11 in 1993 until July of 2003 revealed only fifty-one cases in
which some form of the words "discipline" or "ethic" appeared
within ten words of some form of the word "refer" when added to the
original search strategy for Rule 11 cases.' 0' A further review of the
Southwest, Inc., 54 Fed. Appx. 640, 641 (9th Cir. 2003), and remanding the
denial of sanctions because the trial court failed to make findings in support of
its denial. Prewitt v. City of Rochester Hills, 54 Fed. Appx. 817, 819 (6th Cir.
2002).
100. Some of the circuit cases affirmed sanctions against lawyers appearing
in district court cases found in the databases. See, e.g., Augustine v. Adams,
24 Fed. Appx. 941, 941 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming Augustine v. Adams, 2000
WL 1375288 (D. Kan. 2000)).
101. Search of Westlaw, All Federal Cases (Sept. 17, 2003) (search: da (aft
12/01/1993) & da (bef 07/01/2003) & ((((rule) (fed.r.civ.p.) ("federal rule of
civil procedure") ("federal rules of civil procedure") /1 11) ("federal rule of
civil procedure 11") ("federal rules of civil procedure 11") ("fed rules civ.
proc. rule 11") ("fed.r.civ.p. 11")) /s (attorney counsel lawyer) /s (sanct!
disciplin!) & (disciplin! ethic! w/10 refer!))).
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fifty-one cases indicated that only two involved referrals solely to the
relevant state bar disciplinary or ethics authorities. 10 2 One additional
case involved a referral to federal court officials for disciplinary
consideration, 10 3 and one involved a referral to both state and federal
authorities. 104  The remaining forty-seven cases mentioned
disciplinary referrals in many other contexts, such as noting the prior
disciplinary referral of counsel as part of a Rule 11 sanction, 10 5
reversing or rejecting sanctions that include disciplinary referrals,
10 6
stating that a disciplinary referral was not necessary,1 0 7 and cases
involving the 1983 version of Rule 11.108
Thus, the data reveal a very low number--only four cases--of
disciplinary referrals in cases reported to computer databases. After
discipline was referred in these cases, disciplinary authorities could
either decide not to take action, to issue private discipline, or to issue
public discipline. 0 9 Because only the public discipline cases appear
as reported cases, correlating Rule 11 sanctions that include referrals
to disciplinary authorities with resulting discipline captures only the
public discipline cases, which comprise slightly less than sixty
102. Comuso v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 267 F.3d 331, 334, 340 (3d Cir.
2001) (dismissing an appeal from a district court sanction, which included a
referral to Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board); Bullard v.
Chrysler Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1180, 1191-92 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (referring the
matter to the Texas State Bar Association Attorney Discipline Committee).
103. Giangrasso v. Kittatinny Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 865 F. Supp.
1133, 1143 (D.N.J. 1994) (referring the matter to district court's chief judge).
104. Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96, 111 (D.N.J. 1994) (referring the matter
to district court's chief judge and to the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics).
105. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635,
638 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the attorney in question had been referred to
the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission in 1993).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 1996)
(reversing sanctions that included referring the matter to the district court
Standing Committee on Discipline); Marks v. Stinson, 1995 WL 118189, at *2,
*4 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (rejecting request for sanctions including referral to state
disciplinary authorities).
107. See, e.g., Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111
(D.R.I. 2003) (stating that referral to the district court disciplinary panel was
not required).
108. See, e.g., Garr v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1281 (3d
Cir. 1994) (affirming orders from February and July, 1993).
109. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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percent of all lawyer discipline cases.' 1 ° Nevertheless, the following
explains the results of the four explicit disciplinary referrals.
The two cases in which disciplinary referrals were made solely
to the relevant state bar disciplinary or ethics authorities did not
result in subsequent reported discipline cases indicating that the
lawyers were disciplined for the same conduct that triggered their
Rule 11 sanctions. There was a disciplinary action against one
lawyer, however, but the action was held in abeyance after the
lawyer notified the disciplinary authorities that he was suffering from
a disabling condition making it impossible for him to prepare a
defense."' The reported disciplinary case indicates that the lawyer
was transferred to inactive status, but it does not indicate the alleged
disciplinary violations against him. 112  There was not a reported
discipline case involving the second lawyer whose sanction included
a referral to state lawyer disciplinary authorities."
13
The case involving a referral to federal court officials for
possible discipline1 14 did not result in a subseqIuent reported federal
case involving discipline against the lawyer.' 15 A search of state
discipline cases involving this same lawyer, however, revealed that
the lawyer had been named in disciplinary matters predating his Rule
11 sanction. The first disciplinary matter included, among other
alleged violations, a violation of the New Jersey ethics rule for
failing to expedite litigation. 1 6 He received a public reprimand, was
110. See supra text accompanying note 36 (noting that lawyer disciplinary
agencies report that nearly forty percent of all lawyer discipline consists of
private sanctions).
111. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Barish, 829 A.2d 667, 667 (Pa. 2003).
The Rule 11 sanction case against Marvin Barish was decided in 2001. See
Comuso v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 267 F.3d 331, 331 (3d Cir. 2001)
112. See Barish, 829 A.2d at 667. It is possible that this case was based on
his conduct that resulted in Rule 11 sanctions, but the reasons for the discipline
case are not a matter of public record.
113. Search of LEXIS, TX Supreme Court Cases (Sept. 25, 2003) (search:
(E. or Todd or T.) w/2 Tracy and (ethic! or disciplin!). E. Todd Tracy is the
name of the lawyer in the second case where the court made a disciplinary
referral to the Texas State Bar Association Attorney Discipline Committee.
See Bullard v. Chrysler Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1180, 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
114. Giangrasso v. Kittatinny Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 865 F. Supp.
1133, 1143 (D.N.J. 1994) (referring matter to district court's chiefjudge).
115. Search of LEXIS, NJ Federal and State Courts, Combined (Oct. 5,
2003) (search for (Edward w/2 Gaffney) and (ethic! or discipline!)).
116. In re Gaffney, 627 A.2d 105, 105 (N.J. 1993).
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ordered to see a psychiatrist, and was ordered to practice law under
the supervision of a proctor. 17 A year later, he was temporarily
suspended from the practice of law for failing to appear at a hearing
to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of
law.' 8  Later that same year, the New Jersey Supreme Court
followed the recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board and
suspended him from the practice of law for two years and six months
for professional misconduct that included gross neglect of client
matters, lack of diligence, and failure to keep clients informed." 9 In
proceedings two years later, ethics violations led to his suspension
from practice for three more years.'
20
The last sanction case involved disciplinary referrals to both
federal and state disciplinary authorities.' 21 There is no subsequent
reported federal case involving discipline against the lawyer, but
there are several state disciplinary cases involving the lawyer.122 The
first discipline case against him occurred prior to the Rule 11
sanction case, and the New Jersey Supreme Court publicly
reprimanded him for, among other ethics violations, gross neglect of
client matters, failure to act with reasonable diligence, and failure to
protect clients' interests after terminating representation. 23 Neither
of the two subsequent state discipline cases, both decided after his
Rule 11 sanctions, involved a response to the disciplinary referral
made pursuant to his Rule 11 sanctions. 24 The most recent case,
however, mentioned the Rule 11 sanction case.' 25 The New Jersey
Supreme Court disbarred the lawyer based on reciprocal discipline
principles because he had been previously disbarred in New York.
26
117. Id.
118. In re Gaffney, 638 A.2d 134, 134-35 (N.J. 1994).
119. In re Gaffney, 648 A.2d 723, 723 (N.J. 1994).
120. In re Gaffney, 1996 N.J. LEXIS 1111, at *1-*2 (NJ Oct. 21, 1996).
121. Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96, 111 (D.N.J. 1994) (referring matter to
district court's chief judge and to the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics).
122. Search of LEXIS, N.J. Federal and State Courts, Combined (Oct. 5,
2003) (search for (Steven w/2 Kramer) and (ethic! or disciplin!)).
123. In re Kramer, 617 A.2d 663, 663 (N.J. 1993).
124. See In re Kramer, 691 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1997); In re Kramer, 800 A.2d
111 (N.J. 2002).
125. Kramer, 800 A.2d at 114.
126. In re Kramer, 677 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). In an
earlier New York discipline case against the same lawyer, the New York
disciplinary authorities based the discipline in part on findings by a federal
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It is difficult to make any empirical or normative claims about
the relationship between explicit disciplinary referral cases and
subsequent discipline for the same conduct. Three of the four
lawyers involved in explicit disciplinary referrals, however, had
lawyer discipline cases that resulted in their suspension, disbarment,
or placement on inactive status even though one cannot say for
certain that any of their discipline was based in whole or in part on
the same conduct giving rise to their Rule 11 sanctions. It is also
important to remember that judges could be making private
disciplinary referrals, and such referrals would not appear in current
case databases.
The next section explores the correlation between Rule 11 cases
and professional discipline using a different technique. The section
investigates whether lawyers receiving Rule 11 sanctions are also
likely to receive public discipline for that same conduct, or for other
unethical conduct, even when an explicit disciplinary referral is not
made.
C. Correlation Between Lawyers Sanctioned in Reported Rule 11
Cases and Public Discipline of Those Lawyers
As a final step to uncover the relationship between reported Rule
11 sanctions against lawyers and discipline against these lawyers for
that same conduct, I reviewed published discipline cases against the
lawyers after the date of their Rule 11 sanctions. 27 I read each
discipline case to see if the basis for the discipline explicitly referred
to the Rule 11 sanction.
court that the lawyer had made false statements in an affidavit. See In re
Kramer, 664 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2-3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
127. The search methodology started with identifying the lawyer's name
from the federal case imposing or affirming a Rule 11 sanction against the
lawyer. Next, the case was reviewed to identify the state where the district
court imposing the sanction was located. Then, a database search was
conducted to identify cases containing the lawyer's name in the case title
appearing after the date of the case in which the lawyer received the Rule 11
sanction. For example on July 31, 1995, in the case of Gray v. Millea, 892 F.
Supp. 432 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), the district court in New York sanctioned a
lawyer named Thomas Snow for failing to present arguable legal claims. Id. at
437-38. Thus, the following search was conducted on Westlaw, New York
Cases (search: da (aft 07/31/1995) & TI (Thomas w/2 Snow)).
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As discussed previously, trial judges imposed Rule 11 sanctions
against lawyers in 274 district court cases, and circuit courts affirmed
sanctions against lawyers in 170 cases. In searching subsequent
discipline cases involving the lawyers from the combined total of
444 district and circuit cases, only twenty-two of the lawyers
sanctioned in these cases were publicly disciplined. Upon analyzing
each of the discipline cases against these twenty-two lawyers, I
found that only three of the lawyers were disciplined in whole or in
part for the same conduct that triggered their Rule 11 sanctions. 2 8 In
one other case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina suspended a
lawyer from practice based upon a finding of criminal contempt
against him that accompanied a Rule 11 sanction imposed by a
federal court.' 29 In the other subsequent discipline cases, authorities
sanctioned lawyers for other conduct,' 30 or the discipline orders did
not explain the reason for the action taken. 13 1  Because
128. See In re Boone, 66 P.3d 896, 898 (Kan. 2003) (stating that the district
court had found Rule 11 sanctions warranted against the lawyer in Augustine v.
Adams, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan. 2000)); Kramer, 800 A.2d at 114 (noting
that the district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the lawyer in Kramer v.
Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1994)); In re Disciplinary Action Against Pinotti,
585 N.W.2d 55, 59-61 (Minn. 1998) (stating that the district court imposed
Rule 11 sanctions on the lawyer in Bergeron v. Northwest Publ'ns, Inc., 165
F.R.D. 518 (D. Minn. 1996)); Kramer, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 2-3 (stating that the
district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the lawyer in Kramer v. Tribe, 156
F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1994)). As the foregoing cases indicate, one of the lawyers
was disciplined in two different states in part for reported Rule 11 conduct.
129. See In re Bilbro, 559 S.E.2d 318, 318 (S.C. 2001) (citing U.S. v. Bilbro,
81 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1996)).
130. See, e.g., In re Malat, 830 A.2d 499 (N.J. 2003) (suspending lawyer for
ethical violations unrelated to Rule 11 sanctions imposed in Carlino v.
Glouster City High Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.N.J. 1999)); Cuyahoga County
Bar v. Okocha, 697 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio 1998) (disbarring lawyer for ethical
violations unrelated to Rule 11 sanctions affirmed in Johnson v. Cleveland
Heights/Univ. Heights Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 66 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1995)).
131. See In re Christopherson, 62 P.3d 1146, 1146 (Nev. 2000) (stating "Bar
Order" in a decision without opinion); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v.
Mraz, 676 A.2d 78, 78 (Md. 1996) (stating the thirty day suspension from the
practice of law was by consent). The Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court
Rule 11 sanction against Paul Mraz, the lawyer in the Maryland discipline
case, for filing an action not supported by the law. Mraz v. Bright, 46 F.3d
1125 (4th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
imposition of a Rule 11 sanction against Ian Christopherson, the lawyer in the
Nevada discipline case, for filing a "baseless" motion that was "a mere attempt
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approximately 40% of all lawyer discipline cases involve private
unreported sanctions, 132 it is not possible to determine whether Rule
11 sanctions result in private sanctions.
The foregoing analysis of reported cases demonstrates very little
correlation between reported state discipline cases based upon the
same conduct triggering Rule 11 sanctions since the 1993
amendments. This data is consistent with a survey of lawyer
disciplinary authorities in 1992 and 1993 revealing that "few, if any,
Rule 11 violations had been reported" under the 1983 version of
Rule 11.133 Although this investigation demonstrates little empirical
evidence of a relationship between Rule 11 sanctions and subsequent
lawyer discipline, it begs the question, advanced by some
commentators, of whether there should be such a relationship. In the
next part of this article, I analyze the institutional interests at stake
and discuss whether lawyers should face discipline for the conduct
underlying their Rule 11 sanctions.
IV. RULE 11 SANCTIONS AND STATE LAWYER DISCIPLINE REGIMES:
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
The rules and institutions controlling lawyers' conduct comprise
a complex system. As discussed previously, ethics rules, statutes,
inherent judicial power, and court rules often proscribe the same
conduct. 134 Thus, a court can sanction a lawyer for abusive litigation
conduct and the applicable lawyer disciplinary authority may
discipline the lawyer for the same conduct that triggered the Rule 11
sanction. The fact that courts and disciplinary agencies may work in
tandem in this fashion has led some commentators to predict or
recommend more Rule 11 disciplinary referrals and more lawyer
discipline following Rule 11 sanctions. 135 But is this a good idea?
to vex the defendants or to gain a tactical advantage." Kalinauskas v. Wong,
No. 95-16645, 1997 WL 67691, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1997).
132. See Survey on Lawyer Discipline, supra note 36, chart II.
133. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 9, at 52-53.
134. See supra Part H.
135. See Brown, supra note 9, at 1606-16 (advocating mandatory reporting
of all Rule 11 violations to disciplinary authorities); Parness, Disciplinary
Referrals, supra note 9, at 38-39, 44-47 (predicting that the 1993 version of
Rule 11 should produce more disciplinary referrals).
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A. Institutional Relationship Between Rule 11 and Ethics Rules in
Disciplinary Enforcement
1. Rule 11 conduct and the Model Rules
Presumably, lawyer discipline cases based on Rule 11 sanction
cases would be grounded on a state's ethics rule equivalent to ABA
Model Rule 3.1, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law."'13  The language of Model Rule 3.1 is
strikingly similar to Rule 1 's language that by filing, submitting, or
advocating a pleading or other filing to the court, the lawyer is
"certifying that... the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law."
137
Although Rule 11 sanctions may implicate conduct proscribed
by other ethics rules, 38 authorities agree that "Rule 3.1 parallels and
is best analyzed in tandem with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." 139 This connection between Model Rule 3.1 and Rule 11
is reinforced by the fact that most states follow the Model Rules.'
40
Since most states follow the Model Rules, the analysis of the
institutional relationship between Rule 11 and ethics rules will focus
primarily on the Model Rules.
2. Rule 11 disciplinary referrals and reporting professional
misconduct under the Model Rules
In addition to the closely aligned language between Rule 11 and
Model Rule 3.1, referrals to disciplinary authorities as sanctions
136. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 3.1.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
138. See supra Part lI.A for a discussion of several other ethics rules
proscribing conduct that may give rise to Rule 11 sanctions.
139. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 40, at 321; see also Brown,
supra note 9, at 1604 (noting that "there is an undeniable link between Rule 11
and Model Rule 3.1").
140. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (stating that more than forty
states base their ethics rules on the Model Rules).
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under Rule 11 have a counterpart in the duty to report professional
misconduct under Model Rule 8.3.141 Under Model Rule 8.3, a
lawyer "who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question
as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional
authority."' 42 Model Rule 8.3 also states that the duty to report does
141. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment
(discussing disciplinary referrals under Rule 11).
142. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 8.3(a). Although more than forty
jurisdictions base their ethics rules on the Model Rules, several states have not
adopted a reporting requirement analogous to Model Rule 8.3, "believing it
unnecessary." Julie L. Hussey, Reporting Another Attorney for Violating the
Rules of Professional Conduct: The Current Status of the Law in the States
Which Have Adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 23 J. LEGAL
PROF. 265, 270 (1998/1999). For example, Georgia and Kentucky have
adopted the Model Rules without the reporting requirement. See id. Illinois
adopted the reporting requirement, but limited it to reporting only certain
criminal acts, dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. ILL. SUP. CT. R.
PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 8.3 (2003) (limiting the duty to report to violations of
Rule 8.4(a)(3) or (a)(4)). The related Illinois ethics rule states: "(a) A lawyer
shall not... (3) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (4) engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." ILL. SUP.
CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 8.4(a)(3)-(4) (2003).
Other states, such as Washington, have adopted a non-mandatory duty
to report by stating that lawyers "should promptly inform the appropriate
professional authority" of a lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. WASH. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.3(a) (2003). On the other hand,
Louisiana has a stricter reporting standard, and states that "[a] lawyer
possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of this code shall report such
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act
upon such violation." LA. ST. BAR ASS'N ART. XVI, RPC 8.3(a) (2003).
Thus, under the Louisiana rule, a lawyer or judge must report all violations of
the ethics code and not just those that raise a "substantial question" as to the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.
The Model Code analog to Model Rule 8.3 is DR 1-103(A), which
states: "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-
102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon such violation." MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 1-
103(A). DR 1-102 states:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
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not require disclosure of information protected by client
confidentiality, 43 thereby subordinating the duty to report to the duty
of confidentiality. 144 Therefore, before a lawyer has a duty to report
in a jurisdiction that follows Model Rule 8.3, a four-part test must be
met: (1) Does the lawyer "know" or have sufficient knowledge of the
facts and conduct of the putative lawyer? (2) Does the conduct of
the putative lawyer constitute a violation of the ethics rules? (3)
Does the lawyer's knowledge of the putative lawyer's conduct fall
under the protection of client confidentiality or does it fall under an
exception? (4) Does the putative lawyer's violation of the ethics
rules raise a substantial question concerning the offending lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer?
45
In considering the reporting obligation under Model Rule 8.3 in
the context of Rule 11 sanctions, the first two prongs of the four-part
test will usually be met. The finding of the court in imposing the
sanction usually will satisfy the knowledge requirement, 46 and the
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law.
Id. DR 1-102. Thus, under the Model Code approach, the duty to report
extends to the violation of any disciplinary rule.
143. "This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6 or information gained by a lawyer or judge while
participating in an approved lawyers assistance program." MODEL RULES,
supra note 13, R. 8.3(c). Model Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer "shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted" by carefully defined
exceptions, such as "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm." Id. R. 1.6.
144. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 40, at 599.
145. An opinion of the District of Columbia Bar Ethics Committee sets forth
the four-part test. See D.C. Bar Op. 246 (1994).
146. The Model Rules definitional section states: "'Knowingly,' 'known,' or
'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." MODEL RULES, supra note
13, R. 1.0(f). Thus, the filing by the putative lawyer and the subsequent Rule
11 procedures and sanctions will provide the bases for both the judge and the
other lawyers involved in the case to "know" the conduct of the putative
lawyer.
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Rule 11 standard proscribes conduct that is the same as, or at least
similar to, conduct the Model Rules prohibit.
147
The third prong-that client confidentiality must not preclude a
lawyer from reporting the Rule 11 violation-may be a more
difficult test to meet. Although the putative lawyer's conduct will be
made known by the public filing of a pleading or other paper with
the court, the confidentiality rule provides that "in the absence of the
client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information
relating to the representation."'' 48 Confidential information under the
applicable ethics rule is much more expansive than attorney-client
privilege, which only protects lawyer communications to or from the
client under certain conditions. 1 Thus, the confidentiality rule
"applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representation,
whatever its source." 15° Most courts and ethics opinions agree that
the duty of confidentiality requires a lawyer to obtain a client's
consent to report another lawyer's ethical misconduct.' 5' This
147. See supra Part IV.A.1.
148. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6 cmt. 2.
149. Although client confidentiality and attorney-client privilege are closely
related doctrines justified by many of the same rationales, such as encouraging
full and frank communication between client and lawyer, they are not the
same. The two doctrines are often confused, and many lawyers and judges
mistakenly use the words "privileged and confidential... interchangeably as
synonyms for one another." See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal,
Teaching Ethics in Evidence, 21 QuINNIPIAC L. REv. 961, 963 (2003). The
confidentiality rule is directed at lawyers and controlled by ethics rules while
"[t]he rule of attorney-client privilege is aimed at the government-usually
judges-and commands them not to compel lawyers to divulge privileged
communications." Id. at 968.
150. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6 cmt. 3.
151. For example, the District of Columbia Bar Ethics Committee has stated
that even when information is a "matter of public record" a client must still
give consent to the lawyer to use the information under the reporting obligation
of Model Rule 8.3. D.C. Bar Op. 246 (1994). See also In re Ethics Advisory
Opinion No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317, 322-23 (RI. 1993) (stating that the duty to
report professional misconduct does not authorize a lawyer to disclose any
information relating to "the representation of a client" without the client's
consent); Ariz. Ethics. Op. 94-09 (1994) (stating that a lawyer may not report
attorney misconduct learned in the representation of a client without the
client's consent). The Illinois Supreme Court took a different view, however,
and stated that "[a] lawyer may not choose to circumvent the [reporting] rules
by simply asserting that his client asked him to do so." In re Himmel, 533
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restriction, however, would not apply to judges, who also have a duty
to report professional misconduct.
52
A client may withhold permission and prevent her lawyer from
reporting an opposing lawyer's violation of Rule 11, thereby
frustrating the reporting requirement for any number of reasons. The
client may believe that reporting the Rule 11 violation will have a
negative impact on negotiating a settlement or may further
complicate and prolong the litigation, 153 reporting the opposing
lawyer's misconduct would embarrass or otherwise harm the
client, 154 or reporting is unnecessary because the Rule 11 sanction
was a sufficient punishment.
Even if the potential reporter is a judge, who does not need a
client's consent to report misconduct, or a lawyer, who has a client's
permission to report conduct triggering a Rule 11 sanction, the fourth
prong of the test must still be satisfied before the reporting duty is
required. The putative lawyer's violation of the ethics rule must
raise a "substantial question" concerning the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. Satisfying this fourth prong is
much more difficult because there is no precise'definition of which
ethics violations meet this "substantial question" test.
The terminology section of the Model Rules defines
"substantial" as "a material matter of clear and weighty
N.E.2d 790, 793 (Ill. 1988). Ethics authorities have criticized the Himmel case
for failing to analyze the apparent conflict between the duty to report and the
duty of confidentiality owed to a client. See, e.g., LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra
note 13, at 101:203-04 (stating that critics of the Himmel case point to the
court's failure to reconcile the competing duties); Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of
Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 90-1 (1990) (rejecting the Himmel
analysis).
152. "A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct [substitute correct title if the applicable rules
of lawyer conduct have a different title] that raises a substantial question as to
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects
shall inform the appropriate authority." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3(D)(2) (2003). According to the American Judicature Society,
approximately twenty jurisdictions have adopted codes of judicial conduct
based on the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See GELLERS & SIMON,
supra note 13, at 622. Approximately fifteen additional jurisdictions have
adopted some provisions of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See id.
153. See D.C. Ethics Op. 246 (1994).
154. See Or. Ethics Op. 1991-95 (1995).
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importance."' 155 A comment to Model Rule 8.3 provides no more
guidance. It states "'substantial' refers to the seriousness of the
possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the
lawyer is aware."'
5 6
The "safe harbor" provision in the current version of Rule 11,
however, suggests that courts are sanctioning conduct that
disciplinary authorities should not only view as Model Rule 3.1
violations but as issues raising a "substantial question" at least in
regard to a lawyer's fitness to practice law. Under the safe harbor
provision, a lawyer may make a filing that is not grounded in fact or
supported by law and still avoid sanctions by withdrawing or
correcting an offending filing within twenty-one days of service of a
motion by an opposing party.157  Pursuant to the safe harbor
mechanism, courts sanction only those lawyers who persist in
asserting a contention for which they did not have support after
receiving notice that their position lacked merit. Such conduct
appears to be exactly the type of conduct proscribed by Model Rule
3.1, and it appears to demonstrate a lawyer's recalcitrant nature.
However, the analysis of Rule 11 conduct in light of how ethics
committees treat the "substantial question" requirement is less clear.
Except in the few jurisdictions where all ethics violations must be
reported,158 ethics committees "seem reluctant to announce any
155. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.0(1).
156. Id. R. 8.3 cmt. 3.
157. Rule 1 I(c)(1)(A) provides:
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with, or presented to the court unless,
within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the
court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If
warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion
the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or
opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm
shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its
partners, associates, and employees.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c)(1)(A). The safe harbor, however, does not apply when
the court imposes sanctions on its own initiative. See FED. R. Civ.
P.1 l(c)(1)(B).
158. See, e.g., LA. ST. BAR ASS'N ART. XVI, RPC 8.3(a) (2003) (requiring
lawyers to report every unprivileged knowledge of "a violation" of the ethics
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bright-line test clarifying what kind of conduct raises a 'substantial
question about the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer. "1 59 As a result, ethics committees defer to the judgment of
lawyers and judges to determine if the conduct of another lawyer
satisfies the "substantial question" standard, and very few cases
reveal lawyers being disciplined for their failure to report
professional misconduct of another lawyer. 1
60
Thus, an ethics committee has stated that members of a bar
journal executive committee "must decide for themselves" whether
they have a duty to report a lawyer who admitted to plagiarizing
another in an article the bar journal published. 161 Another ethics
committee determined that a lawyer must make a "preliminary
subjective judgment" whether a forgery by a lawyer "rises to a level
sufficient to raise a substantial question about the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to practice law."'162 Yet another ethics
committee stated that a lawyer "must exercise... [her] own
professional judgment to determine whether the alleged conduct of
rules); see also supra note 142 (discussing the rules of states that have not
adopted reporting requirements analogous to the Model Rule 8.3).
159. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 101:205.
160. "If we look through all the courts of this land, it is virtually unheard of
to find a case where a lawyer is disciplined merely for refusing to report
another lawyer." Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another
Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv.
977, 982. The disciplinary charge of failing to report another lawyer's
unethical conduct is usually one that is added to other charges--normally
involving the lawyer aiding the unethical conduct the lawyer failed to report.
See id. (citing cases where the lawyer is disciplined for doing something else
wrong, typically aiding the unethical conduct the lawyer failed to report).
161. Md. Ethics Op. 98-16 (1998). A lawyer admitted to plagiarizing an
article that appeared in a bar association journal, and the bar association
executive committee asked the Maryland State Bar Association Ethics
Committee if the members of the executive committee had a duty to report the
plagiarism. Id.
162. Conn. Informal Ethics Op. 97-30 (1997). The lawyer requesting the
ethics opinion represented a client in a lawsuit involving a real estate
transaction where the putative lawyer admitted to signing someone else's name
as the witness on a deed and signed the signature acknowledgment even
though another signature was forged. Id. After considering all of the facts
presented, and acknowledging that the lawyer must still decide the "substantial
question" issue for himself, the ethics committee opined that it believed there
was "a duty to report" the lawyer filing a forged deed document. Id.
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the various lawyers" involved in perjury required reporting.163 Other
ethics committees appear to handle these questions on a case-by-case
basis, 164 and a lawyer or judge must be familiar with the ethics
decisions in the jurisdiction to understand the scope of the reporting
duty.
Assuming that all four prongs of the reporting test are met, there
is still one additional hurdle that may exist when a court has imposed
a Rule 11 sanction. The reporting duty states that reports shall be
made to the "appropriate professional authority,"'65 and a comment
to Model Rule 8.3 refers to "the bar disciplinary agency unless some
other agency, such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate in
the circumstances."' 66  Despite the language in the comment
directing lawyers to report to the "bar disciplinary agency," there are
advisory ethics opinions stating that when a lawyer has reported the
alleged misconduct to the court having jurisdiction over a case in
which the misconduct arose, the lawyer's reporting duty is
discharged because the "courts are an appropriate disciplinary
authority."' 167 If that is the view of the bar disciplinary authorities in
163. Md. Ethics Op. 2001-5 (2001).
164. For example, the Connecticut Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics surveyed several of the committee's prior opinions and
determined that ex parte communications with a judge did not present the
"requisite degree of odiousness" to implicate the duty to report. Conn.
Informal Ethics Op. 94-33 (1994). Instead, the ethics committee noted that
normally the conduct would have suggested "an intentional, perhaps even pre-
meditated, effort to abuse the position of the attorney to the advantage of the
offending attorney." Id. See also Kan. Ethics Op. 94-13 (1994) (reasoning
that verified sexual relations with a client "appears" to implicate the reporting
rule if the information is not protected by client confidentiality).
165. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 8.3(a).
166. Id. R. 8.3 cmt. 3.
167. Conn. Informal Ethics Op. 99-47 (1999). In another opinion, the
Connecticut Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics stated:
[R]eporting unethical conduct to a court having jurisdiction over a
case in which the alleged misconduct arose discharges the reporting
lawyer's duty under Rule 8.3, precisely because the court is an
appropriate disciplinary authority. Rule 8.3 mandates reporting
misconduct by members of the bar; it does not impose an obligation
beyond reporting to an appropriate disciplinary authority. Therefore,
no duty to make further report is warranted.
Conn. Informal Ethics Op. 99-51 (1999).
806 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:765
a jurisdiction, then a lawyer may conclude that there is no other
reporting duty when a judge imposes a Rule 11 sanction.
The numerous qualifications and hurdles necessary before a
lawyer or a judge has a mandatory duty to report professional
misconduct implicated in Rule 11 sanctions essentially means that
for most lawyers and judges there is no mandatory duty to report. In
many ways, the non-mandatory duty to report under the ethics rule is
the counterpart of the non-mandatory requirement under Rule 11 for
a judge to make disciplinary referrals a part of the sanction. The next
section evaluates the policies underlying these institutional choices.
B. Institutional Choices Underlying the Relationship Between Rule
11 Sanctions and Disciplinary Enforcement of Ethics Violations for
Rule 11 Conduct
The empirical analysis demonstrating a negligible correlation
between the Rule 11 sanctions and reported lawyer discipline for that
same conduct suggests a number of institutional choices underlying
the relationship between Rule 11 sanctions and disciplinary
enforcement of ethics violations for Rule 11 conduct. The empirical
analysis points to an implicit division of authority concerning the
regulation of lawyer litigation conduct in federal courts. In this
division of authority, federal district court judges wield primary
control over the litigation conduct of lawyers appearing before them.
Structural features of both Rule 11 and prevailing ethics rules, both
of which do not require either judges or lawyers to report Rule 11
violations to lawyer disciplinary authorities, 68 reinforce this division
of authority by virtually guaranteeing that in most instances the Rule
11 sanctions will be the only public sanctions imposed on lawyers
for their litigation conduct.
1 69
168. See supra Part IV.A.2.
169. Because approximately forty percent of all sanctions by attorney
disciplinary bodies at the state level consist of private sanctions, such as
private reprimands or admonitions, see Survey on Lawyer Discipline, supra
note 36, chart II, one cannot say for sure that state disciplinary authorities are
not issuing private sanctions to lawyers who receive Rule 11 sanctions.
However, one survey of state disciplinary authorities suggests that they rarely,
if ever, receive reports of lawyers violating Rule 11, and therefore rarely
pursue disciplinary complaints based on Rule 11 sanctions. See Parness,
Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 9, at 52-53 (reporting results of a 1992-
1993 survey of state disciplinary authorities). Even if state disciplinary
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In addition to the structural features of Rule 11 and the ethics
rules, which do not require either referrals to or reporting of Rule 11
sanctions, there are at least four additional institutional choices that
underlie the primacy of federal judges in controlling litigation
conduct before them: first and foremost, lawyer disciplinary agencies
are unable or unwilling to control litigation conduct; second, the
legal profession has determined that trial judges are more effective in
controlling litigation conduct in pending matters; third, prevailing
standards for enforcing lawyer discipline and standards for imposing
lawyer sanctions downplay imposing public sanctions for litigation
conduct; and fourth, the legal profession's failure to coordinate
federal courts' actions with and state lawyer disciplinary agencies
contributes to vesting federal judges with the primary responsibility
for enforcing norms of acceptable lawyer litigation conduct in
bringing lawsuits and making other court filings. The following
subsections analyze these institutional choices.
1. Unwillingness of lawyer disciplinary agencies to control litigation
conduct
Writing about the impetus for the 1983 amendments to Rule 11,
Professor Richard Underwood observed that escalating frivolous
litigation and the "perceived inability or reluctance by the bar to
police its ranks through disciplinary actions"'170 served to "encourage
the use of Rule 11 as a sanctioning mechanism for deterring
groundless litigation." 171 Professor Underwood's observations hold
true today, as lawyer disciplinary authorities rarely impose sanctions
after receiving complaints against lawyers, and there is little
indication that they impose discipline after lawyers receive Rule 11
sanctions.
172
authorities do issue private reprimands to lawyers receiving Rule 11 sanctions,
those private sanctions simply promote specific deterrence on the lawyer
sanctioned and have little or no general deterrent effect on other lawyers
because the private sanctions usually are not publicized. See Levin, supra note
36, at 22.
170. Richard H. Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of
Adversary Ethics - The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 625, 630-
31(1982).
171. Id. at 642.
172. See supra Part IlI.C.
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In 2000, state lawyer disciplinary agencies dismissed
approximately 39% of complaints against lawyers for lack of
jurisdiction," 3 and disciplinary agencies dismissed nearly 47% of the
complaints they investigated. 74 Of the remaining complaints, formal
charges were filed in slightly less than 7% of the matters. 175 Once
formal charges were filed, it appears that authorities imposed
discipline in most instances, though the ABA does not specifically
correlate the number of lawyers formally charged with the number
disciplined. 176 When disciplinary agencies impose sanctions, nearly
41% of the sanctions are private and approximately 59% are public
sanctions. 177 Thus, only a small fraction of complaints ever result in
lawyer discipline, and a large percentage of the discipline meted out
is in the form of private sanctions.
This data on lawyer discipline nationwide does not include a
breakdown on the types of rule violations involved in lawyer
173. See Survey on Lawyer Discipline, supra note 36, chart I (stating that
57,247 of 146,583 complaints received and pending with disciplinary agencies
were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
174. See id. (stating that 42,126 of 90,359 complaints investigated were
dismissed after investigation).
175. See id. (stating that 3360 formal charges were brought against the
remaining 48,233 complaints).
176. State disciplinary agencies reported to the ABA that the agencies
formally charged 3360 lawyers. See id. chart I. The state disciplinary agencies
reported that authorities imposed 4010 public sanctions. See id. chart II. The
ABA does not ask agencies to report the number of lawyers sanctioned after
formal charges are issued. See id. charts I, II; Telephone Interview with Ellyn
S. Rosen, supra note 36 (stating that the ABA does not ask state disciplinary
agencies to correlate the sanctions imposed with the number of lawyers
formally charged). The data reported do not make it clear why there are a
greater number of public sanctions than the number of lawyers formally
charged, though the greater number of sanctions may result from disciplinary
authorities imposing more than one type of public sanction on some formally
charged lawyers. Id.
177. See Survey on Lawyer Discipline, supra note 36, chart II (stating that
private sanctions were imposed in 2734 cases and that public sanctions were
imposed in 4010 cases). The ABA urges state disciplinary agencies and high
courts not to issue private sanctions after a formal complaint is filed, though
agencies and courts do so anyway. Telephone interview with Ellyn S. Rosen,
supra note 36; see, e.g., DEL. LAW. R. DISCIPL NARY PROC. 8(a)(6)-(7)
(stating that the Delaware Supreme Court may issue a private admonition or
private probation); Id. 9(d)(5) (stating that after formal disciplinary
proceedings the disciplinary board shall submit findings and recommendations
to the Delaware Supreme Court).
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discipline, but reports from disciplinary agencies in state bar journals
often do. An annual report from Missouri on the types of complaints
made against lawyers in 2002 helps to illustrate how rarely
complaints are made based on litigation conduct.
178
In 2002, 2002 letters of complaint were filed against lawyers in
Missouri. 179 The Office of Disciplinary Counsel determined that 878
did not warrant investigation, 729 required formal investigation, 153
were referred for resolution outside of the disciplinary process, 139
were referred for informal resolution, and 103 were referred to fee
dispute committees.I1°
Of the 729 complaints opened by the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel in Missouri, not a single complaint was based on a violation
of Missouri Rule 3.1.181 The report on the informal resolution
process similarly shows that not a single complaint involved filing
frivolous lawsuits. 182
Communication problems with clients, lack of diligence,
dishonesty or misrepresentation, conflicts of interest, and
safekeeping client property issues comprised the greatest number of
complaints. 8 3 This complaint data supports the view that lawyer
discipline is primarily focused on client-centered issues; Is4 abusive
178. See generally Maridee F. Edwards, Report of the Office of Chief
Disciplinary Counsel for the Year 2002 Together with the Financial Report of
the Treasurer of the Advisory Committee Fund for 2002, 59 J. Mo. B. 238
(2003) (discussing the complaints filed against Missouri lawyers in 2002).
179. Id. at242.
180. Id. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel in Missouri has the authority to
refer complaints to three person volunteer complaint resolution committees
whenever disciplinary counsel determines that the complaints should be
resolved outside of the formal disciplinary process. See 1 MO. CT. R. 5.10
(2003). The court rule establishing the process does not define the types of
matters that may be resolved by this informal, confidential process. See id.
181. See Edwards, supra note 178, at 246.
182. See id. at 247.
183. Out of the 729 complaints disciplinary counsel formally investigated,
295 involved communication problems, 163 diligence issues, 51 dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, 39 conflicts, and 38 safekeeping client
property. See id. at 246.
184. Professor William Simon explains that the "Dominant View" in legal
ethics assumes that the most important ethical duties are those owed to the
client. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETHIcs 8 (1998). Simon points out that this Dominant View
permeates the Model Code and the Model Rules. Id. Thus, it is no surprise
that the bulk of the bar complaints in Missouri focused on issues directly
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litigation conduct, such as frivolous filings, does not commonly
trigger complaints leading to lawyer discipline.
Both the data correlating Rule 11 sanctions with subsequent
lawyer discipline and the Missouri data on the types of complaints
against lawyers suggest that, as Professor Jeffrey Parness has argued,
only the most serious litigation misconduct should be referred to
lawyer disciplinary agencies and trial judges presiding over cases are
best able to handle less serious litigation misconduct. 185 Although
neither federal district court judges nor bar disciplinary agencies
acknowledge that such an institutional choice has been made, there
appears to be little proof to the contrary.
2. Trial judges are more effective at controlling litigation conduct
Both the 1983 and 1993 versions of Rule 11 strengthened the
role judges have in regulating lawyer litigation conduct in matters
pending before trial courts. In many ways, the strengthening of Rule
11 responded to the call by former Chief Justice Warren Burger in
1980 to change rules and procedures that aided litigation abuse and
for judges to act "to prevent or correct abuse and misuse of the
system."' 8 6 Justice Burger urged trial judges to "take a more active
role in the management of litigation," and stated that "[s]anctions
must be used to prevent or penalize abuses."'
187
Justice Burger's call, more than twenty years ago, recognized
that judges are more effective at controlling litigation conduct than
the disciplinary processes of the legal profession. While some
commentators have argued that federal district court judges are
"usurping the function of the bar association and disciplinary
affecting clients, such as communication problems, lack of diligence,
dishonesty or misrepresentation, conflicts of interest, and safekeeping property.
See supra note 183. Indeed, nationwide clients file most disciplinary
complaints. See Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and
Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917, 946-49, 973;
Wilkins, supra note 11, at 823.
185. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 9, at 59-60.
186. Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary - 1980,
66 A.B.A. J. 295, 296 (1980).
187. Id.
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processes" through the use of Rule 11 sanctions,18 8  other
commentators and courts have maintained that trial judges are best
able to regulate lawyers' conduct in matters pending before them.1
8 9
In many ways, federal district court judges use Rule 11 to enforce
ethical norms for litigation conduct "that state disciplinary bodies
have been unable or unwilling to enforce."'190 Judicial enforcement
of acceptable norms for litigation is both consistent with the
historical role of the judiciary and evidence that judges play a key
role in regulating lawyer behavior in bringing and defending cases.
The efficacy of judicial control of litigation conduct is
supported, at least in part, by the data on Rule 11 sanctions. Of the
274 Rule 11 sanction cases involving lawyers decided since 1993,191
only five lawyers were sanctioned in multiple cases.192 This data is
confirmed by the anecdotal observation of one judge who observed
that "[i]t is not often that one encounters a recidivist violator of Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 93 The lack of repeat
188. Stephen R. Ripps & John N. Drowatzky, Federal Rule 11: Are the
Federal District Courts Usurping the Disciplinary Function of the Bar?, 32
VAL. U. L. REv. 67, 69 (1997).
189. See, e.g., Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1261 (8th Cir. 1993)(stating
that district court judges are best able to preserve the integrity of trial
proceedings); Parness, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 9, at 59 (stating that
sanctioning less serious professional misconduct is best handled by the trial
judge).
190. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional
Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793, 797-98 (1991).
191. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
192. Noemi A. Collie was sanctioned in two cases. See Dailey v. Vought
Aircraft Co., 141 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 1998); Collie v. Kendall, 1999 WL 329740
(N.D. Tex. May 20, 1999). Samuel A. Malat was sanctioned three times. See
Carlino v. Gloucester City High Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.N.J. 1999) affirmed
Carlino v. Gloucester City High Sch., 44 Fed. Appx 599 (3d Cir. 2002);
Luallen v. Borough of Paulsboro, 180 F. Supp. 2d 615 (D.N.J. 2002); Mendez
v. Draham, 182 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D.N.J. 2002). Erik C. Mobius was
sanctioned twice. See Garcia v. Wash, 20 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming
Rule 11 sanctions); In re Wood, 167 B.R. 83 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
Herbert H. Victor was sanctioned three times. See Boyce v. Microsoft Corp.,
1995 WL 153281 (N.D. Ill. April 6, 1995); Burkhalter v. Brisk Transp., Inc.,
1994 WL 411396 (N.D. I11. 1994); Fernandez v. Galen Hosp. Ill., Inc., 1997
WL 675042 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1997). Stephen A. Weingard was sanctioned
twice. See MAI Photo News Agency, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 2001 WL
180020 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001); Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc.,
2003 WL 1787123 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2003).
193. Mendez, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
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offenders is a strong indication that judicially imposed sanctions are
working.
3. Lawyer disciplinary enforcement rules and standards for imposing
sanctions disfavor lawyer discipline for litigation conduct
Until the mid-1980s, there were no standards for imposing
lawyer discipline, 194 and the ABA did not adopt the Model Rules for
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement until 1989.195  The lack of
standards was just one feature of largely dysfunctional lawyer
disciplinary systems in the United States that a special ABA
committee described as "scandalous" more than thirty years ago.
196
The ABA committee found that "the prevailing attitude of lawyers
toward disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to outright
hostility" and that "[d]isciplinary action is practically nonexistent in
many jurisdictions."'197 Twenty years later, a new ABA commission
found that "revolutionary changes" had taken place, and that many of
the problems that existed in the late 1960s and early 1970s had been
corrected. 98
The Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement set forth a
category described as "lesser misconduct," which is described as
"conduct that does not warrant a sanction restricting the respondent's
license to practice law."' 199  Rather than defining "lesser
misconduct," the rules state that conduct may not be viewed as lesser
misconduct if the conduct involves the "misappropriation of finds,"
"results in or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client or
other person," "involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or
misrepresentation," is a serious crime, is the same as conduct for
which the respondent was disciplined within the past five years, or
"is part of a pattern of similar misconduct., 20 0  Thus, except in
194. Levin, supra note 36, at 31.
195. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra
note 36.
196. A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970).
197. Id.
198. See McKAY REPORT, supra note 14, at xiv.
199. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note
36, R. 9B.
200. Id.
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extreme cases of Rule 11 violations, or for lawyers who repeatedly
violate Rule 11, the disciplinary enforcement rules permit potential
ethics violations based on Rule 11 violations to be treated as lesser
misconduct that would, if pursued by disciplinary authorities, not
normally result in sanctions restricting the putative lawyer's right to
practice law.
201
Similar to the Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement, the
Model Standards for Lawyer Sanctions do not usually treat litigation
misconduct prohibited by Rule 11 as a serious matter. The standard
describing "abuse of the legal process" mentions the possibility of
sanctions for "failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious
claim., 20 2  Examples of sanctions under this standard focus on
knowing violations of a court order or rule to gain an advantage in a
203matter, or other violations that do not involve violations of Rule
11. 204 Although it is possible that a Rule 11 sanction may fit the
definition of the sanction standard for abuse of legal process, the
Model Standards fail to illustrate this possibility with an example.
This failure to discuss or illustrate how Rule 11 conduct may lead to
discipline appears to suggest that disciplinary sanctions for Rule 11
violations are not a priority under the Model Standards for Lawyer
Sanctions. As Professor Ted Schneyer observed, "disciplinary
agencies normally leave enforcement [of prohibitions against taking
frivolous positions] to the courts. 205
4. The legal profession fails to coordinate state lawyer discipline
with the federal judiciary
The lack of data demonstrating a high correlation between state
disciplinary proceedings following Rule 11 sanctions illustrates the
general lack of coordination between the federal judiciary and lawyer
disciplinary agencies. State courts reviewing federal discipline
201. See id.
202. MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6.2 (2003).
203. See id. 6.21 cmt. (stating that disbarment is appropriate for intentionally
misusing the legal process to benefit the lawyer or another).
204. See id. 6.22 cmt. (stating that suspension is appropriate for knowing
violations of court orders applying directly to lawyers); id at 6.23 cmt. (stating
that reprimands are appropriate for violating court orders or rules and injuring
clients or others by causing delays or neglecting matters).
205. Schneyer, supra note 16, at 255.
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reserve the right not to impose reciprocal discipline,20 6 thus state
disciplinary authorities are not required to accept Rule 11 sanctions
as per se indication of state ethics violations.
Similarly, despite the shared language between Rule 11 and
Model Rule 3.1, one commentator notes "the ABA has stubbornly
refused to acknowledge or sanction the use of the Model Rules as the
standard for Civil Rule 11 or any other motion practice.
' 207
As a result of this disjunction between the federal judiciary
imposing Rule 11 sanctions and lawyer disciplinary agencies, federal
judges regulate litigation practice by "prefer[ing] to sanction [Rule
11] violators directly, rather than referring them to disciplinary
agencies. ' 208 And this appears to be a wise choice, one that enables
judges to control lawyers' litigation conduct directly, to fashion
appropriate remedies, and to impose remedies close in time to the
offense.
V. CONCLUSION
The lack of correlation between Rule 11 sanctions and
subsequent lawyer discipline for the Rule 11 conduct suggests that
enforcing norms against bringing or maintaining frivolous positions
in federal courts is almost exclusively the province of judges. These
data reflect an institutional division of authority that recognizes the
many advantages judges have over lawyer disciplinary bodies in
regulating lawyers' litigation conduct. Judges possess "expertise in
evaluating pleadings and motions, a strong interest in protecting the
integrity of proceedings in their own courtrooms, and power to
dispose of the issue without initiating an entirely new proceeding."
20 9
The primacy of federal judges controlling litigation conduct is
further supported by the lack of mandatory duties to refer or report
Rule 11 sanctions to disciplinary authorities, the structure of lawyer
206. MCMORROW & COQUILLETrE, supra note 41, § 806.04[4][c].
207. Richard G. Johnson, Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional
Responsibility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
819 (2004). Richard Johnson cites language from the scope provision of the
Model Rules in which the ABA maintains that violation of an ethics rule
should not, itself, give rise to a cause of action against the lawyer or serve as
the basis for remedies in addition to a disciplinary action. Id. at zzz.
208. Schneyer, supra note 16, at 255-56.
209. Id. at 256.
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disciplinary enforcement and sanction standards that focus more on
ethics rule violations directly affecting clients rather than litigation
conduct, and the lack of coordination between the federal judiciary
and state disciplinary systems.
The institutional structures and relationships combine to create a
system of lawyer regulation in which Rule 11 sanctions serve as the
only punishment for lawyers asserting frivolous positions in most
cases. The judges and lawyers involved in litigation matters, where
frivolous positions have been asserted, have wide discretion to refer
or report such violations, and there is little data to suggest that such
referrals or reporting of Rule 11 violations routinely take place.
Thus, public discipline of lawyers in addition to Rule 11 sanctions is
rare, and the limited data available suggest that professional
discipline for Rule 11 violations is reserved for the worst offenders
or those involved in other ethics violations. Absent proof that a large
number of lawyers are repeatedly violating Rule 11, the present
informal allocation of primary authority to trial judges to curb
frivolous litigation appears to be a sound institutional choice.
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Appendix A
Appeals of Rule 11 Sanctions Against Lawyers or Lawyers and
Parties*
Circuit Affirmed Reversed Other Total Cases
First 9 0 2 11
Second 30 10 17 57
Third 9 0 1 10
Fourth 23 2 6 31
Fifth 17 7 3 27
Sixth 51 4 6 61
Seventh 35 9 5 49
Eighth 20 1 1 22
Ninth 62 22 10 94
Tenth 30 2 4 36
Eleventh 12 4 0 16
D.C. 5 1 2 8
Federal 7 4 4 15
Total 310 66 61 437
* See supra note 95 and accompanying text. This chart provides the circuit-
by-circuit breakdown of cases in which the circuit courts affirmed, reversed, or
took other action, such as remanding or vacating trial court decisions, in cases
where lawyers or lawyers and parties received Rule 11 sanctions, or the trial
court declined to impose Rule 11 sanctions. See also supra note 99 and
accompanying text.
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Appendix B
Analysis of Circuit Rulings in Rule 11 Sanction Cases*
Cir. Affirmed Reversed Other Total
Imposed Denied Imposed Denied
Sanction Sanction Sanction Sanction
Atty. Party Atty. Party Atty. Party Atty. Party
1st  5 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 11
2nd  15 5 4 6 8 2 0 0 17 57
3 rd  6 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 10
4th  13 3 1 6 2 0 0 0 6 31
5t 8 5 0 4 6 1 0 0 3 27
6th  15 14 6 16 2 1 0 1 6 61
7t 20 9 2 4 6 0 2 1 5 49
8 th 13 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 1 22
9 th 39 9 4 10 20 2 0 0 10 94
101h  15 8 2 5 1 1 0 0 4 36
11th  12 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 16
D.C. 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 8
Fed. 4 1 0 2 3 1 0 0 4 15
Total 170 58 24 58 52 10 2 2 61 437
* See supra note 95 and accompanying text. This chart provides the circuit-
by-circuit analysis of rulings in Rule 11 sanction cases. See also supra note
101 and accompanying text.
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